



TEMPA

Demystifying Tesla's Bluetooth Passive Entry System



About **trifinite.org**

- Group founded in August 2004 by
 - Collin Mulliner
 - Martin Herfurt (me)
- Pioneered in Bluetooth (Classic) Security
- Participation in tech. Testing events organized by the Bluetooth SIG – helping vendors with security
- Webpage renewed in 2022 !

About Me


- Martin Herfurt
- Co-Founder of **trifinite.group** (est. 2004)
 - First Bluetooth Security Research team (trifinite.org)
 - Created Bloover Application (now on GitHub)
- Author of App „Tesla Radar“ (teslaradar.com)
- Owner of a black 2019 Tesla Model 3

Memory Lane

Feb. 2005



2006



Why you shouldn't use Tesla PAAK



Project TEMPA – Investigating BLE

- Technical Background about Tesla's Passive Entry system
 - Found on all Tesla Models 3/Y
 - Found on Tesla Model S/X 2021+
 - About **2 million+** vehicles to date
- Identifying/Tracking vehicles
- Exchanging messages with vehicles via Bluetooth LE
- Possible impacts on vehicle's security


Project TEMPA – Investigating BLE

- Some of the things have been (partially) fixed and improved during the time of this research
- Findings reverse-engineered from the official Tesla app for Android and from observed messages
- Research started in 06/2019
- Research intensified in 06/2021 with VCSEC

PhoneKey

- Tesla's BLE-based Passive Entry System
- Introduced with Model 3 in 2018
- Idea: The owner's phone replaces the car key/fob
- Now also in use in Model Y and 2021 Facelift S/X
- Very likely to be part of future Tesla Models

Ways to Unlock a Tesla (S/3/X/Y)



Tesla (S/3/X/Y) Unlock Methods (1)

- NFC-Card
 - Owners get two whitelisted NFC-Cards with car
 - Different form-factors sold on Internet (e.g. KeyRing)
- Usage
 - card is held to driver-side B-pillar to unlock
 - card is held to middle-console to drive/authorize
 - No passive entry!

Tesla (S/3/X/Y) Unlock Methods (2)

- PhoneKey
 - Feature of the official iOS/Android app
 - Based on Bluetooth LE (BLE) / NFC
 - Allows „passive entry“ and basic security functions
- Usage
 - Phone is carried by owner
 - Authorization to unlock/drive via BLE / NFC / Online

Tesla (S/3/X/Y) Unlock Methods (3)

- KeyFob
 - Small Device (sold extra for 160€)
 - Based on Bluetooth LE (BLE)
 - Allows “passive entry” (in later versions (starting with V. P60))
- Usage
 - Keyfob is carried by owner
 - Authorization to unlock/drive via BLE / NFC
 - Authorization via tap on B-pillar or middle console

Twitter Poll (1)



Tesla Radar
@TeslaRadar



How do you unlock your Tesla Model 3/Y?Please RT

- Key Fob
- Phone Key
- NFC Card

How does PhoneKey BLE work?

1. Smartphone with app finds vehicle

- Smartphone identifies vehicle
- Smartphone connects to vehicle

2. App on smartphone communicates with car

3. Car (un)locks / starts / opens etc.

1. Smartphone with app finds vehicle

- Car advertises GATT services via BLE (Peripheral)
 - Name (standard)
 - To Vehicle (Tesla)
 - From Vehicle (Tesla)
- manufacturer data has iBeacon structure
 - UUID, major ID, minor ID
- There used to be four visible beacons per vehicle!

BLE Advertisement

- Manufacturer-Data (uses iBeacon format)
 - enables iPhone background vehicle detection
- UUID
 - 74278BDA-B644-4520-8F0C-720EAF059935
- Major/Minor ID (2 bytes each)
 - Random values (collissions possible but unlikely)

2. Smartphone identifies vehicle

- BLE device name(s)
 - Structure: **S<8 bytes in hex>C** (D,P,R)
 - Guess: C(enter) D(river side) P(assenger side) R(ear)
- Major/Minor ID (mainly for iPhone)
- <8 bytes in hex>
 - Seemed random at first
 - Unique to vehicle

PhoneKey

- Smartphone with TeslaApp (Android/iOS)
- Phone initiates BLE connection to vehicle
- Vehicle identified by iBeacon Name
 - Bluetooth Device Address is not used, as iOS devices obfuscate this for privacy
- IMU State has been added (380s)
 - IMU = Inertia Monitoring Unit


Unique to vehicle!

- Always turned on
- Visible to anyone with BLE radio
- Privacy issue!
- Stalking
 - Compare: Privacy discussion concerning Apple AirTag (AirTag even randomizes ID)
 - Similarities to Tesla's PhoneKey

Correspondence with Tesla (in 2019)

- Complaint concerning unique identifier
 - Does not change over time
 - Owners cannot turn signal off
- Tracking cars/owners becomes possible
- Tesla acknowledged this fact and wrote that this situation and its implications are accepted risks/circumstances

Tesla Radar



- Project first published in August 2019 (Chaos Camp)
- With no understanding of all the inner workings
- Android App (available in Play Store)
- Crowdsourcing vehicle discovery
- First: Showcasing privacy issues
- Then: Game for the Tesla fan community with rankings etc.
- And: data-collection for research

Tesla Radar



49

Countries



154364

Spotted Tesla Cars



3107

Spotting Devices




1361054

Observations

www.teslaradar.com

VIN Structure (17 Digits)

- Manufacturer ID
- Model Type
- Manufacturing Plant
- Manufacturing Year
- Serial Number
- Check-Digit



- Standard/Dual/Performance
- LHD/RHD?
- Battery Type

VIN Detection

- 16 character String used as part of the iBeacon name (8 hex-encoded bytes)
- Created from SHA1-hash over Vehicle VIN
 - VIN Identifier
- Reverse ID->VIN via special Rainbow-Table
- Used for identifying vehicles in Owner-List

VIN Index

- All possible Tesla VINs (with PhoneKey)
 - Research about production numbers in different plants
 - Research on web-pages for used Teslas
- Size: 217140601 objects ~ 20GB
- Hit-Rate: 98.75%
- Used for model-detection in TeslaRadar app

Wardriving 2.0 (BLE)



Premiere: The Tesla Parking Lot Job



<https://youtu.be/eDbSzVTYqBY>

Correspondence with Tesla (in 2021)

- Bug-Bounty request concerning relay attack
 - Attackers can open car (and maybe steal it or at least some parts / stuff)
- Tesla acknowledged this fact and wrote that this is “a known limitation“ of the Phone Key Feature and that people should use PIN2Drive
- pwn2own: Not interested in Relay-Attacks!

Twitter Poll (2)



Tesla Radar
@TeslaRadar




As a Tesla Owner: Which of these features are active in your car(s)? [#Tesla](#) [#Poll](#)
Please RT for reach!

- None
- Sentry Mode
- Pin to Drive
- Both

Relay Attack != Relay Attack

- RF Relay Attacks (PHY Layer) → Limited Range
 - Limited by signal RTT (for passive methods like NFC)
 - Limited by signal strength
- MitM Relay Attacks (Link Layer)
 - Not so much limited by signal time/strength
 - Could be limited by protocol (Network Layer) mechanisms (e.g Bluetooth Legacy Pairing)

MitM Relay Attack from Video



Possible Scenario (not tested)

- Flight Mode:
 - WiFi/BT is allowed
- Attacker has On-Board Internet-Access
- Complice at airport parking lot has access to vehicle... for hours



VCSEC Protocol

- Based on Google Protocol Buffers (protobuf), later Square/Wire
 - Perfect match for limited bandwidth in BLE
- Defines interaction between Security Devices and the Vehicle
- Deducted Use-cases
 - PhoneKey
 - KeyFob
 - TP (Tire Pressure Subsystem)
 - Backend-Communication (?)
 - Maybe even more use-cases




VCSEC History (1)

- Introduced in App V3.3.5-344 (April 2018)
- App Version 3 makes use of Google/Protobuf
 - Extractable with pbtk tool
- Current App Version 4 uses Square/Wire
 - Very similar output – but no extraction with pbtk
 - Custom script to extract proto-file from POJOs from decompiled Android app (experimental)

VCSEC History (2)

- Introduced in App V3.3.5-344 (April 2018)
- Four major iterations so far
 - VCSEC.proto v1 (2018-04-12 - V3.3.5-344)
 - 22 Messages and 9 Enums
 - VCSEC.proto v2 (2019-11-28 - V3.10.2-388)
 - 53 Messages and 27 Enums
 - VCSEC.proto v3 (2020-06-21 - V3.10.6-407)
 - 62 Messages and 32 Enums
 - VCSEC.proto v4 (2022-05-13 – V4.8.1-1032)
 - 77 Messages and 45 Enums

VCSEC – App Version 4.8.1 (05/22)



77 Messages

45 Enumerations

Colored entities are referenced in decompiled BLE plugin code

BLE-Endpoints (Characteristics)

- Service
 - 00000211-B2D1-43F0-9B88-960CEBF8B91E
- Characteristic: **To Vehicle** (write)
 - 00000212-B2D1-43F0-9B88-960CEBF8B91E
- Characteristic: **From Vehicle** (read/subscribe)
 - 00000213-B2D1-43F0-9B88-960CEBF8B91E

(De)Serializing messages via shell

- Serialized messages are often represented as hex-encoded strings (e.g. 00040a021001)
- Size prefix (2 octets) – not compatible with protoc
- Shell scripts in Tesla VCSEC Archive (github)

```
$> cat message.txt | protoc --encode=VCSEC.ToVCSECMessage  
-I . VCSEC.proto | xxd -p -l 100
```

```
$> cat message.hex | xxd -r -p | protoc --  
decode=VCSEC.FromVCSECMessage VCSEC.proto
```

Cryptographic Keys

- Every Key Entity has EC Keypair

- Based on prime256v1 curve

```
$> openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout -out created_key.pem
```

- Shared secret is derived used via Diffie-Hellman key exchange

- 128 bit


- Used for authentication/encryption

Whitelisting Keys

- Process requires key with OWNER_ROLE & NFC
- Max. 19 keys can be enrolled per vehicle
 - More keys / slots / channels possible?
 - `WHITELISTKEYPERMISSION_MODIFY_FLEET_RESERVED_SLOTS`
 - Fleet mgmt is a business feature introduced in 02/22
- Whitelisted keys are referenced with keyID
 - KeyID = first 4 bytes of SHA1(public key)

Whitelisted Keys (InformationReq)

```
whitelistInfo {
  numberOfEntries: 9
  whitelistEntries {
    publicKeySHA1: "$\206\202d"
  }
  whitelistEntries {
    publicKeySHA1: "S` \031\375"
  }
  ...
  whitelistEntries {
    publicKeySHA1: "\221=\210\205"
  }
  whitelistEntries {
    publicKeySHA1: ";\223\300\027"
  }
  slotMask: 511
}
```



Service Key (Most likely NFC)

```
whitelistEntryInfo {  
  keyId {  
    publicKeySHA1: "$\206\202d"  
  }  
  publicKey {  
    PublicKeyRaw: "\004\333\243\225\271\237\217:\\"022*yCX\000\3741_\\"  
357b\261w\216\315\\367\313j\037\201wH\006q\204\350\264V\025\0054Sc\"  
305L\356\234\216\343\nZ\033\005>/L\032\214\373W7Q\322\255\244"  
  }  
  keyRole: ROLE_SERVICE  
}  
  
sessionInfo {  
  token: "\256\006Mj\270\237\277Y\310\223\023w\235\221<I\270\375,5"  
  publicKey: "\004M)d\2136\372\201J\rh\253\354\220cZ\307_\\"  
276\320\3568\212G\016\202f\223\025m\267\360\241!}\232\372vH\304_\\"  
3532\244\023\016@1hbA\315\276g(+22q\235\3663R.\367"  
}
```

Example (NFC)

```
whitelistEntryInfo {
  keyId {
    publicKeySHA1: "S` \031\375"
  }
  publicKey {
    PublicKeyRaw: "\004\323\332\321U-\320;=\215\014\331\025)C\303c*/\\\
024\016\007\207\347dd\r\216Q5\342v\362\360\2
67\336{\224\354R\376\332\203\243Z\377_\3267D\3577\215V\343P\315A\306\3603}\3027"
  }
  metadataForKey {
    keyFormFactor: KEY_FORM_FACTOR_NFC_CARD
  }
  slot: 1
  keyRole: ROLE_OWNER
}

sessionInfo {
  token: "^v\355*\345\374#\242Y\374\277N\277\347\202\303\355\265\t\177"
  publicKey: "\004M)d\2136\372\201J\rh\253\354\220cZ\307_\276\320\3568\212G\016\202f\
223\025m\267\360\241!}\232\372
vH\304_\3532\244\023\016@1hbA\315\276g(+22q\235\3663R.\367"
}
```

Example (PhoneKey)

```
whitelistEntryInfo {
  keyId {
    publicKeySHA1: "U\2346\373"
  }
  publicKey {
    PublicKeyRaw: "\004>\347\2741[\240\372\030\334h\017\034Z\251\304o\272\202$\320\010N3\374\005\362\032\316#\}\323\270\241\262\ '\337\375\243\200\316d\245\007\337\266F\017\036\335\201pM\017\254S\022\274\200\320W\210\307\3230"
  }
  metadataForKey {
    keyFormFactor: KEY_FORM_FACTOR_ANDROID_DEVICE
  }
  slot: 4
  keyRole: ROLE_OWNER
}



sessionInfo {
  token: "h\234*\257\022\234o\375\223+\367}\330\030a\021r)/\301"
  counter: 44
  publicKey: "\004M)d\2136\372\201J\rh\253\354\220cZ\307_\276\320\3568\212G\016\202f\223\025m\267\360\241!}\232\372vH\304_\3532\244\023\016@1hbA\315\276g(+22q\235\3663R.\367"
}
```


Example (KeyFob)

```
whitelistEntryInfo {
  keyId {
    publicKeySHA1: "\007\273\036o"
  }
  publicKey {
    PublicKeyRaw: "\004\005\375\367GJ\235\32235\253\255\207\007HL\"|\177S\225=]\
016\211\237\377Rs)v\370\274\307@#\016]$\276\342\314\024\261\373\2067\342\316\337TA\
262\017\330\004\353\353J\337\307\265{\007v\002"
  }
  metadataForKey {
    keyFormFactor: KEY_FORM_FACTOR_3_BUTTON_BLE_CAR_KEYFOB_P60
  }
  slot: 5
  keyRole: ROLE_OWNER
}

sessionInfo {
  token: "\322\304J\250\277>\036i(\0229\022{\255$\323v\027\\\245"
  counter: 2479
  publicKey: "\004M)d\2136\372\201J\rh\253\354\220cZ\307_\276\320\3568\212G\016\202f\
223\025m\267\360\241!}\232\372vH\304_\3532\244\023\016@1hbA\315\276g(+22q\235\3663R.\
367"
}
```

Roles and Permissions



FM = Fleet Manager (?)

Service Key Permissions

WHITELISTKEYPERMISSION_ADD_TO_WHITELIST
WHITELISTKEYPERMISSION_LOCAL_UNLOCK
WHITELISTKEYPERMISSION_LOCAL_DRIVE
WHITELISTKEYPERMISSION_REMOTE_UNLOCK
WHITELISTKEYPERMISSION_REMOTE_DRIVE
WHITELISTKEYPERMISSION_CHANGE_PERMISSIONS
WHITELISTKEYPERMISSION_REMOVE_FROM_WHITELIST
WHITELISTKEYPERMISSION_REMOVE_SELF_FROM_WHITELIST
WHITELISTKEYPERMISSION_MODIFY_FLEET_RESERVED_SLOTS

FromVCSEC



- All VCSEC messages that originate from Vehicle
- Most frequent messages:
 - vehicleStatus
 - authenticationRequest
 - commandStatus
- Observation: No cryptographically protected messages from vehicle!

FromVCSEC – Examples (1)

001c1a1a12160a14d658de76f3a930b63410c6b6382a554781979d041802

```
--- FromVCSECMessage ---  
authenticationRequest {  
  sessionInfo {  
    token: "\326X\336v\363\2510\2664\020\306\2668*UG\201\227\235\004"  
  }  
  requestedLevel: AUTHENTICATION_LEVEL_DRIVE  
}  
-----
```

FromVCSEC – Examples (2)


00072205120308de15

```
--- FromVCSECMessage ---  
commandStatus {  
  signedMessageStatus {  
    counter: 2782  
  }  
}
```

00040a021001


```
--- FromVCSECMessage ---  
vehicleStatus {  
  vehicleLockState: VEHICLELOCKSTATE_LOCKED  
}
```

ToVCSEC




- All VCSEC messages that are sent to vehicle
- Depending on use-case:
 - unsignedMessage
 - Not cryptographically protected
 - signedMessage
 - Crypto: AES-GCM (AEAD)

unsignedMessage



- Used for messages **without** direct security context
- Used as encapsulating message for signedMessage cryptograms

signedMessage



- Used for messages **with** direct security context
- Used as encapsulating message for signedMessage cryptograms
- IMUState: used for mitigating relay attack(!?)


Signed Messages

- Galois Counter Mode with Associated Data
AES-GCM AEAD
 - Prevents replay attacks (counter)
 - Rolling Code
 - Prevents KPA attacks
 - GMAC
 - Additional Data (session token data in requests)
 - Also prevents replay attacks

GCM Structure (Tesla)

- SharedSecret 16 octets
- Invocation-Counter only 4 octets (not 8) (counter)
- Signature/Tag (GMAC) 16 octets
- Additional Data (optional) 20 octets (session token)
 - **SIGNATURE_TYPE_AES_GCM**
 - **SIGNATURE_TYPE_AES_GCM_TOKEN**

RKAction_E



- Used for control commands in app/fob
- Is encapsuled in unsignedMessage before encryption

SignedMessage_information_E

- What could possibly go wrong with encryption?

SignedMessage_information_E

```
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_NONE  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_UNKNOWN  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_NOT_ON_WHITELIST  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_IV_SMALLER_THAN_EXPECTED  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_INVALID_TOKEN  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_TOKEN_AND_COUNTER_INVALID  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_AES_DECRYPT_AUTH  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_ECDSA_INPUT  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_ECDSA_SIGNATURE  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_LOCAL_ENTITY_START  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_LOCAL_ENTITY_RESULT  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_COULD_NOT_RETRIEVE_KEY  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_COULD_NOT_RETRIEVE_TOKEN  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_SIGNATURE_TOO_SHORT  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_TOKEN_IS_INCORRECT_LENGTH  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_INCORRECT_EPOCH  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_IV_INCORRECT_LENGTH  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_TIME_EXPIRED  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_NOT_PROVISIONED_WITH_IDENTITY  
SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_COULD_NOT_HASH_METADATA
```

HandlePulledWithoutAuthSpecificPayload

```
HandlePulledWithoutAuthDeviceSpecificPayload
RSSICenter: Int
RSSIFront: Int
RSSILeft: Int
RSSINFCradle: Int
RSSIRear: Int
RSSIRearLeft: Int
RSSIRearRight: Int
RSSIRight: Int
RSSISecondary: Int
authenticationLevel: AuthenticationLevel_E
highThreshCenterPresent: Bool
highThreshFrontPresent: Bool
highThreshLeftPresent: Bool
highThreshNFCPresent: Bool
highThreshRearLeftPresent: Bool
highThreshRearPresent: Bool
highThreshRearRightPresent: Bool
highThreshRightPresent: Bool
highThreshSecondaryPresent: Bool
keyChannel: Int
present: Bool
rawDeltaBayesLeftPresent: Bool
rawDeltaBayesRightPresent: Bool
sortedDeltaBayesLeftPresent: Bool
sortedDeltaBayesRightPresent: Bool
```

- Rather new „Alert“ feature
- Introduced in app Version 4.3.0
- First vehicle firmware 2022.12.3

FromVCSEC – Alert with Payload

0023ea02200a1e08d806180128013215080618012075287b305f3867680170017801880101


```
--- FromVCSECMessages ---
alert {
  alertHandlePulledWithoutAuth {
    timeSinceAlertSet_ms: 856
    connectionCount: 1
    authRequested: true
    deviceSpecificPayload {
      keyChannel: 6
      present: true
      RSSILeft: -59
      RSSIRight: -62
      RSSIRear: -48
      RSSICenter: -52
      highThreshLeftPresent: true
      highThreshRightPresent: true
      highThreshCenterPresent: true
      highThreshRearPresent: true
    }
  }
}
```

From VCSEC – Alert with less details

0018ea02150a1308f4051801320c0804180120772877306d386f

```
alert {  
  alertHandlePulledWithoutAuth {  
    timeSinceAlertSet_ms: 756  
    connectionCount: 1  
    deviceSpecificPayload {  
      keyChannel: 4  
      present: true  
      RSSILeft: -60  
      RSSIRight: -60  
      RSSIRear: -55  
      RSSICenter: -56  
    }  
  }  
}
```


RKAction_E



- Used for control commands in app/fob
- Is encapsuled in unsignedMessage before encryption

SignedMessage Example

0018ea02150a1308f4051801320c0804180120772877306d386f

--- ToVCSECMMessage ---

```
signedMessage {  
  protobufMessageAsBytes: "h\001\251\242"  
  signatureType: SIGNATURE_TYPE_AES_GCM_TOKEN  
  signature: "}\246\023E\306\257/\274\037\026\032\375#\355\222"  
  keyId: "\'\365\030\021"  
  counter: 2781  
}
```

Possible Replay Attack

- Observation: Session Token does not change very often
- Get SessionData from vehicle (counter, token)
- Spoof Authentication Requests to phone
- Record and replay Phone response

Key Drop Attack (fixed)

- PhoneKey App sends signed message
- Attacker answers for vehicle:
 - `SIGNEDMESSAGE_INFORMATION_FAULT_NOT_ON_WHITELIST`
- PhoneKey app invalidates whitelisted Key
- User is locked out
- Was working in December 2021 – now fixed!

Tesla's Mitigation: Relay Attack

- Supposed to be mitigated by IMU_STATE
- IMU_STATE is UnsignedMessage
- IMU_STATE can be injected by an Attacker

Key Enumeration (unrestricted)


- Formfactors (what kind of devices?)
- Active Keys (how many users/keys)
- Counters (which key is used over time?)
- Service Key ID (maybe service region?)
 - Two alternating keys identified (Europe?)

What about the KeyFob?

- Research in Progress
- Vehicle initiates connection to KeyFob
- GATT-Structure similar to Vehicle when connection via PhoneKey
- Only connectable when in motion (10s Timeout)
- Shorter Messages compared to PhoneKey comm

Tool: tempara

- tempara.py (on github)
 - Tesla VCSEC client based on Bleak library
 - For **your** Tesla, only!
- Version 0.1.1
 - templates for key enumeration
 - de/encoding of VCSEC messages



Resource: VCSEC Archive

- All VCSEC.proto files to date (on github)
- Provided for educational purposes
- Derived from decompiled Android app
- Shell scripts to get started (protoc rquired)
 - decode.sh script
 - encode.sh script



Tool: VINTag

- VINTag.py (on github)
 - API Client for VIN decoding
 - Requires free RapidAPI account / API key
- API Endpoints:
 - <https://rapidapi.com/trifinite/api/tesla-vin-identifier>
 - s3xy: resolves Model Type
 - location: manufacturing location
 - year: manufacturing year
 - vin: complete VIN detection (not free)




What do you think?



TeslaKee: Doesn't talk to strangers!

- Does talk to your car
- Replacement for Tesla's PhoneKey
- Protection against:
 - Relay Attacks
 - Theft
 - Soon (Q3/2022) available for Android... and maybe later for iOS

www.teslakee.com - Please leave your contact to stay in the loop!



Conclusion

- Relay-Attacks are possible
 - PIN2Drive feature should be used / promoted better
 - Tesla PhoneKey really talks to anyone
- VCSEC does **not** stand for “**V**ehicle **C**ontrol **S**ecurity“
 - It stands for **V**ehicle **C**ontrol **S**econdary
- Convenience/Ease of Use trumps Security (again)
 - PhoneKey cannot easily be deactivated, etc.

Credits

- Slawomir Jasek, SecuRing (gattacker.io)
- Sandeep Mistry, noble/bleno
- Skylot, jadx
- Lex Nastin (similar work)
<https://teslabtapi.lexnastin.com/>

Thanks for your attention!

Questions?

trifinite.org/martin



<https://recon.cx>

Next Talk... new stuff!



<https://thehackermind.com>

A little more background in
the upcoming interview!